Abstract. This paper uses daily fund flow data to examine the extent of late trading in the mutual fund industry. Using data from a 10-15 percent subsample of the industry,
Introduction
On September 3, 2003, New York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer announced an investigation into the trading practices of mutual funds. This investigation asked whether specific mutual funds had colluded with hedge funds to facilitate the late trading of their funds. Under the forward pricing rule, trades in U.S.-based open-ended mutual funds are to be priced at the next net asset value (NAV) calculated after an order is received.
1 The vast majority of U.S.-based mutual funds calculate NAVs once per day at 4 PM Eastern Time, and so for these funds, orders received before 4 PM should be priced at the NAV calculated on the day of the trade while trades received after 4 PM should instead be priced at the next-day net asset value.
Late trading occurs when investors placing trades after 4 PM receive the 4 PM price. These late traders can use the information revealed after 4 PM to guide their trades: buying funds when their current value is greater than their 4 PM value and selling the funds when the reverse is true. Doing so allows the m to earn expected abnormal returns at the expense of the fund's long-term shareholders.
Prior to 1968, most mutual funds practiced backward pricing, pricing trades using the most recent prior NAV. This created an opportunity for investors, particularly those who were able to avoid sales loads, to dilute long-term shareholders, and the forward pricing rule was adopted to protect average shareholders from this dilution. The rule is extremely well known throughout the industry, since it determines the dating and thus the pricing of mutual fund trades. The NYAG's investigation alleges that mutual fund managers allowed hedge funds to place trades after 4 PM, in some cases as late as 9 PM, that received the 4 PM price. This lowered the returns of the funds involved, but the hedge funds compensated the fund managers by purchasing other financial products. These deals were viewed by the NYAG as the hedge funds essentially paying mutual funds to allow them to dilute their shareholders' assets. This is such an egregious violation of a fund manager's fiduciary responsibilities that one might suppose that it was limited to a few isolated cases. This paper uses daily flow data from a 10-15 percent sample of the fund industry to estimate the extent of late trading, concluding that the practice was more widespread than one might have supposed. I find that in both 2001 and 2003, the average investor in a sample of international and U.S. equity funds lost about 5 and 0.6 basis points to this practice, respectively. If these dilution rates applied industry-wide, it would imply losses to shareholders of about $400 million per year. In addition, there is statistically significant evidence of late trading in the international funds of 15 out of 50 fund families in the sample.
Late trading and market timing
Late trading is related to a practice commonly called market timing. A market timer trades mutual funds in asset classes in which the most recent price as of 4 PM is stale, i.e. does not fully reflect recent market movements.
2 Examples include international equities (due to the earlier closure of foreign markets) and less-liquid assets such as small-cap equities and high-yield and municipal bonds. As is the case with late trading, the market timer buys (sells) funds following positive (negative) market movements, when the current fund value is above (below) the NAV, diluting long-term shareholders in the process. Unlike late trading, market timing has been documented in the academic literature and discussed in the popular press. 3 Market timing is legal, whereas late trading is not. But the SEC has been encouraging funds to restrict market timing opportunities through a combination of fair-value pricing (i.e., updating stale prices to reflect recent market movements) and other deterrents such as monitoring and short-term trading fees. At least until mid-2003, most funds showed a strong preference for addressing the problem solely through fees and monitoring, despite the shortcomings of these solutions. The most notable shortcoming is that whereas proper fair-value pricing removes dilution opportunities from all investors equally, it is difficult to ensure that fees and monitoring are applied to all investors. I remarked on this puzzling preference for fees and monitoring in Zitzewitz (2003) , and postulated that one possible explanation was that fund managers wanted to preserve the right to selectively allow dilution opportunities to specific investors. A component of the NYAG investigation is examining whether funds exempted specific investors from fees and monitoring in exchange for compensation.
Late trading is often practiced in combination with market timing. This is unsurprising, since both practices are based on the underlying principle of trading using information not yet reflected in fund NAVs, both involve the frequent buying and selling of funds, and both benefit from the complicity of the fund mana ger. In the case of Canary Capital Management, the first company investigated by the NYAG, late trading was added onto pre-existing market timing arrangements with a fund and a fund custodian. Since the most profitable market timing opportunities are in international equity funds, and we might expect late trading to be concentrated in these funds as well.
Data and Methodology
The extent of late trading can be determined by measuring the correlation between daily mutual fund flows and unanticipated post-4 PM market movements. In the absence of late trading, all trading decisions for the current day must be made before 4 PM, and thus any correlation between current-day flows and unanticipated post-4 PM market mo vements is likely to evidence of late trading. . (1) The dependent variable is net inflows to the fund, normalized by prior-day assets, where inflows are defined as the difference between the assets of the fund(s) in question and the prior-day assets adjusted for current-day fund returns. The independent variables are changes in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange S&P 500 futures price. The first two terms control for market timing using pre-4 PM information; the third term captures late trading using post-4 PM information. Controlling for pre-4 PM market movements serves two purposes: 1) it controls for any correlation between pre and post-4 PM market movements, which given the liquidity of the S&P 500 future, is minor, and 2) by reducing the variance of the error term, it improves the efficiency of estimation.
A starting time of 4:15 is used for the third term to prevent any staleness in the 4 PM S&P futures price from being improperly classified as late trading. The S&P future is extremely liquid, with bid-ask spreads that are 1-2 basis points at 4 PM, so any staleness should be minor. 9 PM is taken as the stopping time since that was the latest late trading time mentioned in the complaint against Canary Capital Partners, LLC. 5 The starting times for the first two terms are the approximate closing times of most Asian and European equity markets, respectively. Dilution due to late trading can be measured using the following formula:
Conceptually, dilution is the difference between the actual assets of the fund and what the assets would have been had the fund priced itself using the 9 PM value of its assets. If inflows are uncorrelated with post-4 PM market movements, then this measure will be zero. In practice, funds do not calculate a 9 PM NAV, but we can substitute the expectation of the next-day NAV conditional on the 4 PM to 9 PM change in the S&P futures. This approach is analogous to the approach to measuring dilution from market timing used in Zitzewitz (2003) .
The daily fund flow data comes from TrimTabs, which collects daily assets, returns, and distributions from a 10-15 percent sample of the industry and uses these to construct measures of flows. I have daily fund-level data from February 1998 to September 2001, and I supplement this daily asset-class-level data for international and U.S. equity funds from February to July 2003.
An issue with the TrimTabs data is that inflows are reported with a one day lag for most funds (see Zitzewitz, 2003 , Section 4 for a discussion of this issue). 6 I correct for this lag by calculating flows assuming each day's asset figures are pre-flow rather than post-flow, but perform checks below to ensure that this correction is appropriate. Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1) If late trading were practiced as a stand-alone strategy, we might expect it to be practiced in domestic equity funds, since these funds should be more responsive to 4 to 7 PM U.S. market news. One possible reason for the apparent shift in late trading from U.S. to international funds is that 4:15 PM to 9 PM volatility declined after 2000, reducing the profitability of late trading as a standalone strategy, and leading late trading to be done mainly in tandem with international fund market timing. The standard deviation of S&P changes in that time period dropped from 46 basis points from 1998-2000 to 31 basis points in 2001 to 17 basis points in the 2003 sample.
Results
Interestingly, inflows into international funds in 2001 and 2003 are almost as sensitive to post-4PM market movements as to 11:30AM -4PM market movements. Sensitivity to pre-4PM market movements is evidence of market timing, while sensitivity to post-4PM market movements is evidence of late trading. If timing were always being practiced in combination with late trading, one might expect these coefficients to be roughly equal, since traders would be trading based on the 11:30 AM to 7 PM market movement. 7 The 6 An exception to this are funds that cater to high-frequency traders (e.g., Rydex, Profunds, Potomac), which do not report with a lag to TrimTabs. I drop these funds from the sample. 7 A caveat: the beta of international equity markets with respect to the S&P futures varies by time of day, depending on the nature of the news that is typically released at that time of day. I find that the beta of the average international fund with respect to the S&P is roughly 0.4 for 11:30 AM to 4 PM and 4 PM to 5 PM market movements, but rises to about 1.0 from 5 PM to 9 PM. So if the investors practicing market timing and late trading in tandem are sophisticated enough to take the time-varying beta into account and trade closeness of the coefficients suggests that a large share of market timing is being done in tandem with late trading.
8 Table 2 repeats the analysis in Table 1 with a greater disaggregation of time periods on the right-hand-side. In international and domestic equity funds, inflows are statistically significantly related to market movements until at least 7 PM. Table 2 also provides a check of the appropriateness of correcting for the lag in TrimTabs flow data. It is clear from Table 2 that the sensitivity of inflows to market movements from 3AM to 4PM the next day is (a precisely estimated) zero. This suggests that the evidence of late trading reported in Table 1 is not an artifact of improperly adjusting the timing of flows in the TrimTabs data. Table 3 reports estimates of the losses due to late trading. These are calculated using equation (2) These losses are small relative to the losses due to market timing reported in Greene and Hodges (2002) and Zitzewitz (2003) . Although Tables 1 and 2 suggest that fund inflows were almost as sensitive to 4-7 PM market movements as to pre-4 PM movements, the volatility of markets is much lower after 4 PM, and so there is less news on which to trade.
Another way in which to examine how widespread late trading was is to repeat the analysis in Table 1 for individual fund families. My agreement with TrimTabs prevents me from reporting results for individual fund companies, but I can report there is statistically significant evidence (at a 95 percent confidence level) of late trading in international funds from 1998-2001 for 15 out of the 50 fund companies in the TrimTabs sample.
9 In domestic equity funds there is evidence of late trading for 12 out of 96 based on the 11:30 AM to 7 PM change in the expected next -day foreign market price, then one would expect inflows from these investors to be more sensitive to post-4PM changes in the S&P futures. In this case, the coefficients in Table 2 would imply that market timing is practiced in tandem with late trading until 5 PM about 85% of the time, and in combination with late trading until 7 PM about 35% of the time. 8 Or alternatively, that market timing and late trading are being practiced separately but in roughly equal magnitudes. But this seems unlikely, since investors who are practicing late trading in international funds are likely to also be aware of the market timing opportunity. 9 In other words, the coefficient on the 4:15 to 9 PM market movements is positive and significant for 15 out of 50 fund families. The coefficient is negative and significant for 0 and 2 families for international and domestic equity funds, respectively. Regressions for fund families are run by constructing a time series of equal-weighted average inflow-to-assets ratios for a family's funds in a given asset class.
families. Across both samples, there was evidence of late trading in at least one asset class for 16 out of 104 families.
This does not necessarily imply that all 16 fund firms were colluding with late traders. First, given a 95 percent, two-tailed confidence level, one would expect a false positive rate of 2.5 percent. In addition, the NYAG's complaint against Canary Capital Partners suggested that it placed trades through the Bank of America and through a retirement plan administrator, perhaps without the knowledge of some of the fund families involved.
Conclusion
While the amount of long-term shareholder wealth lost due to late trading is large in absolute dollar terms, it is small relative to that lost to market timing. It is also probably smaller than the impact of excess trading due to incentives created by soft dollars (Siggelkow, 2003) and smaller than the cost to investors of choosing high-expense-ratio index funds (Hortascu and Syverson, 2003) .
But charging a high expense ratio for an index fund, overtrading to earn soft dollars, and even allowing market timing are not illegal, whereas allowing late trading is. Late trading is thus suggestive of a different kind of oversight and agency problem within mutua l funds than these other practices. Understanding the extent to which the mutual fund industry engaged in illegal activity that harmed shareholders is of first-order importance in understanding the degree of agency problems in the industry. This is in turn informative about the extent to which policy should rely on the industry as a savings gathering vehicle. In particular, it's informative about the wisdom of policies that compel the use of a particular mutual fund family, such as section 529 educationa l savings plans and some social security privatization proposals. Each line is a regression of daily fund flows on changes in the S&P futures for three time periods. Each column is a regression of inflows on changes in the S&P futures at various times. Standard errors are in parenthesis; significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is indicated with 1, 2, and 3 asterisks, respectively. For equal-weighted regressions, the dependent variable is the arthimetic average of the flow_t/assets_t-1 ratio for each fund in that asset class. For asset-weighted regressions, it is the ratio of the sum of flow_t and assets_t-1 for all funds in that asset class. In both cases, flow is defined as assets_t -assets_t-1*(nav_t+dist_t)/nav_t- Each column is a regression of inflows on changes in the S&P futures at various times. Standard errors are in parenthesis; significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is indicated with 1, 2, and 3 asterisks, respectively. The sample is from 2/98 to 9/01 (2003 is excluded since fund-level data is not available). Dilution is estimated as the sum of (NAV_9PM -NAV_4PM)*flow(t) (equation 2 in the text), where NAV_9PM is the predicted next-day fund NAV conditional on the 4:15 to 9 PM change in the S&P futures. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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